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Divine Foreknowledge and the
Arrow of Time
On the Impossibility of Retrocausation

ALAN G. PADGETT

Recent discussion of divine foreknowledge has raised again the old issue of whether
or not it is possible to bring about the past, that is, to cause the past to be what it was.1
In this essay I argue that such backward causation against time, or retrocausation, is
impossible and thus cannot help us out of the problem of divine foreknowledge and
human freedom. However, this should close the door to only one of many ways of
solving this dilemma.2
To begin, what does it mean to say that some event is impossible or necessary? A
good heuristic device, stemming from Leibniz’s philosophy, is to speak of “possible
worlds. Clearly, the world might have been different, even considering the whole
history of the world past, present, and future. The story of the world, all of it, might be
different. Let us understand a “possible world-story” to be a coherent and compossible set of descriptions of what the world might have been like.3 Every event or object
we stipulate as being in that particular story brings with it any essential and necessary
properties into the world-story in question. Further, to qualify as a world-story, for
every object or event mentioned in the story, a full description occurs in that worldstory. Finally, all necessary truths we assume to be affirmed in every world-story,
though we lack time and knowledge to stipulate every part of the story.4
How best to say that something “happens” or “exists” in a world-story is a delicate
matter. To say that some event “happens” in a world-story, as in any story, is to say that
the description of that event is affirmed in that world-story. An object is real in a story
when its existence or reality is affirmed in that story. A necessary event, then, is one
whose description is affirmed in all possible world-stories which we could (given
prior stipulations and constraints) coherently tell. An impossible event is one whose
65
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description is never coherently affirmed in any story. I will argue that retrocausation is
never properly affirmed in any world-story because it is incoherent or incompatible
W1
Pr‘or Parts of the story of each possible world.
What, then, is backward causation? By retrocausation I understand a complex
event in which one event causes another event which is prior to it in time. Thus a pres
ent event might cause a past event to be what it was, or a future event might cause a
present event to be what it is. Retrocausation involves making the past what it was, not
changing” the past (changing the past is incoherent).51 exclude, from the beginning,
all non-causal relationships between things from consideration as examples of retro
causation. For example, I would allow for the retrosatisfaction of truth conditions for
future-tensed propositions. In other words, I allow that what happens in the future is
what makes future-tensed propositions true or false. This is because the satisfaction of
truth conditions is a logical, not a causal, relationship; it is not an example of retrocauSdtion. e can agree to treat future-tensed propositions as true or false in the abstract
anguage-game of logic, even if no one can know their truth-value until what they descri e takes place (or not). Backward causation against the arrow of time I understand
o e a causal force that occurs between real objects and events, not a relationship be
tween ideas or propositions.
What is it, then, for one thing to cause another? Theories of causation abound in the
i erature. shall adopt one for the purpose of this essay; however, I claim that any ad
equate t eory of causation will come, mutatis mutandis, to the same conclusions I
reach here.
In brief outline, let us agree for the purpose of this argument that one event or thing

states are,Ot
1.
2.
7
4.

a^<llnSt a backgr°tind of certain relevant states of affairs. Among these

the initial conditions at a time
the causal powers of the objects involved
the relevant relationships between the objects involved
the nature of the objects involved

COat‘nuant or “substance”: God, people, and trees are examples of obT • JeCtS 'n concrete relationship create events in spacetime.7 Given
brinus 'lbnin' at,onsb‘Ps’ and states, event A causes event B if the occurrence of A
affairs 8 Because' T l°
CaSC the occurrence ofB in the context of that state of
interested het n t CaUSati°n iS baSed upon the nature of the objects Evolved, I am
powers oJeris^r^ects" ““*
** ** ““
iectshuhk

these nhieot

of nature sre'merel°S°^?rS

‘,f c;"’:,stior, >n terms of laws of nature. But the laws

Thus, the account I give of cam-at on
natUre
CaUSal P°WerS °f ob-lectsis a law of nature that nothin^
t UdeS so'called laws of nature. For example, it
clearly, this law „ „„r
" *"«*-«' ‘W «• 1«<l * light. But
jects and their causal powers The “law f
°f the "atUre °f physical obof the nature and causal powers of phyXlo^tsF * partici”arkind of d—iption
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find tb nement’s st’b needed for this summary outline of causation. Sometimes
bp r
'1Klny CVCllls work together to cause some effect. In this case, A will have
, i n'1SI e,rC<’ a coraP'ex event, a mereological sum of events. Retrocausation
wou d then take place when A, or some part of A, is temporally after its effect, B. To
take an example from Dummett, if I pray that my son would be among the survivors of
a shipwreck in the past, but which I have just heard about, if my prayer is efficacious,
then it will be part of the cause of my son being among the survivors. This would be an
examp e of retrocausation, even though my prayer is only a part of a large complex

.

eVe^ w
causes W son to have been among the survivors.
1 his sketch of the idea of causation leaves open the issue of time in the concept of
retrocausation. The philosophy of time is, if anything, even more complicated than
causation. With respect to the reality of the temporal process from past to future (or
just “process” for short) philosophers basically fall into two camps. There are those
who follow the process theory (or A-theory, or tensed theory) and those who reject
that view in favor of what I call the stasis theory (or B-theory, or tenseless theory).
According to process theories (which come in several types), temporal passage is an
objective part of the world. Stasis theorists deny this proposition, holding that past,
present, and future are subjective or mind-dependent properties of events. Remember,
the time we are talking about here involves the passage from past to present to fu

ture,
not the anisotropy
of time
nor the
measure
time. with respect to the reality of
Possible
world-stories
fall into
three
large of
classes
process in that world-story. First, there are those which are altogether timeless, where
time itself does not come into the story. Second, there are those temporal world-stones
in which the process theory of time is true. Third, there are stasis worlds in which past,
present, and future are subjective and are not affirmed as part of the “real” or external
world. These are all the possibilities there are regarding worlds and time. I shall argue
that retrocausation, it turns out, is impossible in all three of these world-stories, and
therefore is impossible in all world-stories we could coherently tell.
First of all, do these three options exhaust all possibilities? Yes, they do. For time
must be part of a world or not. If it does not occur, then we have the first class of wor stories. If it does occur, then either process is part of that world-story or it is not. If it is,
then we have the second class of world-stories. If it is not, then we have the third class.
So all possible world-stories are included in these three classes.
We begin by considering the case of the first class of worlds. In such stories, events
(if there are any) are completely timeless. The concept of retrocausation, however, en
tails a temporal separation between events. So retrocausation is impossible in t e irst

class
ofnext
worlds,
by definition.
.
Our
consideration
is the class of world-stories in which the passage o time
is
of ontological importance for the objective world, that is, world-stories that a rm e
process theory of time. Our discussion of this class will turn on a rationa intui ion o
noetic insight I offer for your consideration: the causal impassibility and impotence o
the unreal. If something lacks reality, how can it be changed in any way, in a caus
sense? If something lacks reality, how can it affect real things ? On t e process c
of time, the past is unreal. For this reason, it can no longer be affected by nor affect he

present. I cannot now make the past be what it was, because those events are go

i

i
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f Hire is not real and can have
cannot be changed: they no longer exist. Likewise, the iu
.mvthing to happen.12
no effect on the present. For only what is real can direct y
‘
causal chain> that
Now the past, of course, does affect the present, but only t
b
is, only through indirect causes.
ded b the smaiiest
Imagine the history of every object in the 'vorld;s‘°1^
(however short) in
episode in each object’s life. The smallest episodes will be
pfes_
which no change takes place in that object. According to t P
wjn
ent episodes of objects are fully real. The present episode of< Y J
stand to be in a process of becoming. The former episode is ta b
, •
and thus into non-reality. The future episode of the object is coming in
fujj’y reaj
ing from non-reality to reality. Only the present episodes of al o jec s ‘
‘ ’
The present instant (NOW) will thus be an abstract, conceptua , uM 10
which picks out all those real episodes for every existing thing in t e univ
1
are simultaneous with all other real episodes. Only present episodes are u y i ‘ . an
only what is real or actual can directly bring something about (i.e., apart rom a causa
chain of events).
.
The standard objection at this point is that the process theory would not allow us to
bring anything about. For if I cannot affect nor effect the future, then t e u ure wi
never get here. For the very next moment is, after all, future relative to the present. I
cannot bring about the future, then all causation must be simultaneous if it is to lappen
at all (the objection goes). But that conclusion lands us in an infinite regress o simul
taneous causes rather than a temporal progression of causes.
The answer to this problem from a process perspective is to think of the present in
two ways: the present episode of all real objects, and the NOW understood as an ab
stract and conceptual point. The NOW points to all real episodes, without reducing all
real episodes to a durationless instant. Think of this abstraction as a kind of red laser
pointer, which highlights the present episode in all real things, without reducing those
episodes to its own abstract, durationless instant. So the present episode of some real
object is in the process of becoming. It is not a mere instant of time. As the history of an
object advances, it passes from one episode to the next one: what is now present be
comes past (unreal), and what was only potential (future) becomes actual (present).
Such an understanding of becoming does allow for temporal passage. But what counts
as future (and therefore as merely potential rather than fully real) changes with the
passage of time. Thus the future never becomes real asfuture, but only in the process
of becoming. In the process of becoming, what was (merely) future becomes actual
(present).13 So the process theory of time is coherent with our intuition about the
causal impassibility and impotence of the unreal.
Given the intuition that what is not real cannot directly causally affect us, nor can it
be affected, it turns out that any possible world-story which affirms the process theory
of time cannot consistently affirm any description of retrocausation. For any such de
scription would imply a contradiction when joined with our insight about the causal
impotence and impassibility of the unreal. Any stories which we would like to tell
about retrocausation will not be affirmed in any possible world-story with prior com
mitments to both our basic intuition and the process theory of time.1,1
Perhaps the proponent of retrocausation will want to reply that our intuition about
the causal impotence and impassibility of the unreal may be true but is not logically
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necessary. However, before taking this move she ought to r
jeast -n
on the following
point. Part of what we mean when we say something is Tea is t a
when we afprinciple, causally interrelate with other things. So part of what we ^passible. Our
firm that something is unreal simply is that it is causally impotent a
therefore
intuition, then, upon a little reflection, turns out to be an analytic
affirmed in all possible world-stories.
the stasis theory of
This leaves us with the third class of worlds, those that a arm
sense of the
time. In this class of world-stories, duration does occur ( time
illusion, or
word), but temporal process is either denied altogether, or re c8‘^
passage from
understood in some way to be merely subjective. On such t eone ,
eyent Any
future to present docs not change the reality or unreality o any
nQ(. be affirmed
experience of the A-series (as McTaggart called process) simp y
d the primary
in such stories; or it will be seen as a kind of secondary qua 1 y, ‘
stasis thequalities of before, after, and simultaneity. What is objective y
ory, is the B-series of ordered events in a before-after series.
tjon ;s not univerEven within the third class of world-stories, however, retroausation is impossally affirmed. There are some subclasses of worlds in w ic 1 r
certain solusible. One well-known world is the so-called Godel un^er^rtt Q^del.16 In the Godel
tions to the equations of general relativity discovered y “ iv6fse possesses a spaworld-story, the matter in the universe is in rotation, an
wse aqows for closed
tial homogeneity—but not isotropy. This model o «t-metravel.”l7'Whilethematime-like curves for world-lines of objects, and thus or 1
«ome world-lines are
jority of the matter in this universe travels “forward m time,.
possible which are closed, time-like loops. Indeed, for any two points P and Q on the
world-lines of massive material objects, where P is before Q on that line, it is possible
in the Godel universe to travel in such a way as to move “forward” in (local) time, and
still travel from Q “back” to P.
The problem with worlds like this, where one can travel backward and forward in
“time, is that the distinction between before and after seems rather arbitrary. True, for
any given mass it will be possible to designate a local, proper time for that object and
its world-line. But the universe as a whole does not seem to have any objective, uni
versal way of deciding which direction is “past” and which is “future.” The mathe
matics will work in either direction! Granted that the Godel universe is temporally ori
entable, in closed time loops any instance of forward causation is also just as truly
called a case of backward causation. P comes “before” Q in one perspective, and just

as validly P comes “after” Q in another perspective.
Perhaps, one might respond, this is just the way things are. Temporal order is a mat
ter of perspective and convention. If this is so, then of course what looks like retrocau
sation is possible. For the “retro” part of backward causation will not be true univer
sally, and also not true for God (I assume for this paper that God is also temporal in
some sense). What is measured as retrocausation in one frame of reference will be
normal, forward causation in another frame of reference. But of course in this case
what we do not have is genuine retrocausation, that is, backward causation against an
objective arrow of time.
Reflection on the Godel universe leads us to some conceptual necessities for
any world-stories which affirm retrocausation. Two things must be affirmed in any
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world-story in order to make a claim of retrocausation significant: (a) time must be
anisotropic, and (b) the purported case of retrocausation must be in a topologically
open world-line, one which not only in fact but even in principle cannot be closed,
or strictly speaking any “forward” causal connection in a closed time-line could be
just as well called a case of retrocausation. The idea of backward causation includes
the notion that one is going backward against something, after all, and not just arbirarily choosing a temporal starting point and direction (or “arrow”). Thus not every
'yor story in the third class (i.e., stasis worlds) can coherently affirm a genuine and
significant case of
causation.
• Ac“rdlng t0 some Philosophers, time and causation are merely human points of
view, any of these philosophers have been idealists, but not all. Godel himself may
e me u ed among them.18 In some world-stories, therefore, “backward” and “forwar are just a matter of perspective, and thus there is no ontologically real arrow of
ime. n such worlds, genuine retrocausation does not occur because the ordering of
events as before and after is merely conventional. In order for the “backward” part of
e concept to be meaningful for the problem of omniscience (i.e., for God), the arrow
o ime needs to be ontologically real. This provides us with a third criterion, viz. (c)
empora or er and causal asymmetry must be ontologically genuine. Let us call the
or stories which affirm all three of these criteria STAT worlds (stasis theory with
an objective arrow of time).
c„.
ll,ere t0 be any theologically meaningful use for the idea of “backward
evpni A°n’- t 6Se l^ree cr'ter'a must be affirmed. It is indeed logically possible that
z■
mig 1 cause event B, and B would seem to be earlier in time to some human
not hp°
onin’sc’ent> omnipresent God). The problem is that such an event would
„
r^n?° °gIcdby genuine retrocausation, only apparent retrocausation. In such
not future to God
know wbat looked like “future” to us but was not really future,
firmprt
°Ur adent’on n°w to that set of worlds where the stasis theory of time is afSTAT wnri
our three criteria for theologically meaningful retrocausation (i.e.,
of the world S °neS '. tbe A-series of past, present, and future is notan objective part
events in -m’ a^?or.ing t0 STAT world-stories, what accounts for the ordering of
anisotronv of t? ^SCtlv^ ^-series at all? That is, what accounts for the temporal
the coherence of & 71
WOr,ds? This is a keY question for those who would assert
wouiXTe di pp, CarSatl°n- AS Me'l0r WOte’ “If omy
A series existed, that
later must be sough! elsewhere ’^A §
differenCe between earlier and
events is their causal order- “Th AtLOTdlng t0 Mellor, what gives temporal order to
One event occurs before
th
directl0n of time 1S the direction of causation.”21
ond or the second event i - ° ^i
t™6’ because the flrst event is a cause of the secfirms, then fi,at A h f
^imultaneous
some effect of the first. When one afplanation for temporal anlsotr"
tH°Se worId"stories which affirm a causal exsimultaneous Some eZt S’°nC “ ** A " Ca“SaI* Prior to B or A *
one means by temporal precedence Xl° B’However’ when that is wllat
retrocausation is analytically false th-Ns" h
affirmation of a description of
of time simply means Jhe direefion of 7
, ’"7 ? ° COntradk'tio11- Wkcn the arrow

of time is conceptually incoherent

‘

10n’ ackward causation against the arrow
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A more traditional stasis theory about what temporal order consists in, for STA
world-stories, is the view of GriinbaumAccording to this theory, the d^er^ce
tween earlier and later in time has to do with the increase of entropy. Roughly, the am
ity of a system to do “work” is a measure of entropy.23 Increase in entropy entails, t
dissipation of energy from part of the system to the whole and a decrease in the wno
system’s ability to do work, that is, a decrease in available energy. An increase m
tropy involves necessarily a dissipation of energy from some part of the system
system as a whole.
If we affirm a physical theory of the order of time in a STAT world-story, then event
A is before event B if and only if entropy (or some other physical process) .
creased between A and B. This implies that event A is part of an episode ot a y.
with lower entropy than another episode of that system which includes wen
now we have to ask, how is it possible on this theory for B to cause A. ° c
some object (or objects) of which B is an expression will have to bring a ou
these objects will have to expend energy, that is, do some “work.” Remem
^ase
considering cases of natural causation, brought about by real objects. B can
y
A when the objects-in-relation we call B bring about A. But that means
{ lies>
jects will have to increase entropy in order to change from B to A. tts in u
however, that B must (on this theory) be temporally prior to A. An
is
our original supposition, viz. that A was before B in time. So any wor
‘ between
the future might exert to cause the past to be what it was will increase en r P
con_
the future and the past. But this is contrary to the theory of tempora or e
. aum,
sideration. This means that on the theory of temporal order advoca e
once again, retrocausation is impossible.
.
physical
The two cases we have analyzed are similar at several poin .
’
retrocau.
theory of temporal order for STAT worlds will have this same pro em
sation. But on a stasis theory of time, if some Pjysic^’“T^/JXrse? That does
count for temporal order, what does? Is it just a brute fact
ihi]itv of retrocauseem a little hard to swallow. At this point the defender o t e p
order at aU?
sation may object. Why does she have to develop some t eory
. Pfor something to
That is, why does the defender have to affirm some view
‘
defender
M later than another in lime? T!t= answer to £
is mtiau.by ternof retrocausation should tell us what is meant by ret ,
^ns obvious, and those
poral precedence. The possibility of retroca"s“
of lhe possibility of retrowho assert its possibility need to argue for it. The de
. possible. The seccausation owes ns an analysis of what exactly she
„ very large
ond reason is inductive. I have supplied an analys
.
be and found
number of possible world-stories, being as 'XSb^iX* with other

retrocausation to be incoherent in each world-s ory (
jon is incompatible (“ex
truths affirmed in each story). So I conclude a r
rocnusation can give me some
ternally incoherent”) unless and until defenders of retrocausation
g
reason to believe otherwise.
internretations of modern physics imply or inI am aware that certain models or interpretedo
, . g i§ correct) 8UCh models
elude the idea of retrocausation. But 1 mymonc
‘ • ;‘cally faise, ()[. else not examand solutions will (logically must turn out to be
P
y
these models Wlll
pies of retrocausation. More precisely, the world-lines allow
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merely measured as b°f
events connected
e-S->a tacil>°n be£,m W,1J be
ric, and not onto! • a 8 P£lSt” W'tbin some inertia] system and its associated metgued, there are nt?S
1 '2Ca3 4y or Senuinely past. In any case, as William Lane Craig has arward causation doesToToccur 24*Ch modernphysics can be interpreted,in which back"
The ideaofretr & ^bUUal rattler (,1;m a refutation of the possibility of retrocausation.
with other truths Th8^10”’WilGn *S SpePed out’is cit,ler incoherent or incompatible
ble, but merely -i aVC admitted tbat apparent backward causation is logically possibecause God wil/^V1* fetrocausat'on does not help divine foreknowledge. This is
tion to know the future O i
ftlture t0 God’in order to use backward causais present or past to
r t?erwi?e’ God simply uses ordinary causation to know what

on earth). What is f T J V'nC mind ievcn if that event appears to be future to humans
just apparently future tnr?,tOranOm^SCient and omniPresent God is really future, not
°ry of temporal ord ’
° conc us*on> tber>. unless a coherent and compatible the
ologians should avokV^mJ60 by d®fenders of retrocausation, philosophers and thefreedom which imply retro .'°nS *°
probIem of divine foreknowledge and human
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God and Time
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